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In an era of pervasive online surveillance, Internet users are in need of better anonymity solutions for online communications without
sacrificing performance. Existing overlay anonymity tools, such as the Tor network, suffer from performance limitations and recent
proposals to embed anonymity into Internet protocols face fundamental deployment challenges. In this paper, we introduce Practical
Anonymity at the NEtwork Level (PANEL), a practical light-weight anonymity solution based on hardware switching. We implement a
prototype of PANEL on a high-performance hardware switch (namely, Barefoot Tofino) using P4 network programming language, and
examine the validity and performance of the prototype. Based on our empirical results, PANEL achieves 96% of the actual throughput of
the switch and adds a low-latency overhead (e.g., 3% overhead in Skype calls), while offering partial deployablility and transparency
(i.e., PANEL requires neither client-side nor server-side modifications).
1 INTRODUCTION
The state-of-the-art pervasive online surveillance apparatus is capable of recording, aggregating, and analyzing our
online communications, allowing business and government agencies to control, monitor, and influence our online
interactions [1, 2]. Even when the communication content is encrypted, its metadata (e.g., Internet addresses and protocol
specifications) reveal critical information about the parties involved in the communication, which can be exploited by
governments and corporations [3, 4].
Unfortunately, popular anonymity systems today, such as Tor [5], have been only successful in attracting the most
privacy-conscious users due to their poor performance 1. Under the hood, legacy anonymity tools require dedicated
infrastructure: a series of overlay proxies to redirect traffic. This infrastructure typically consists of proxy servers run by
volunteers, often with no performance guarantees, which causes bandwidth and latency issues [8, 9].
To address the performance issues associated with the use of overlay approaches, a number of recent studies have
proposed network-level anonymity solutions [10–16]. However, these proposals are not readily applicable to today’s
Internet due to fundamental deployability challenges. Some solutions [10, 13] entirely modify the Internet routing and
forwarding protocols, requiring a clean-slate design approach [17]. For instance, they rely on end-to-end source-controlled
routing model and its variants, such as segment routing [10, 12, 13], which are still experimental and not ubiquitously
deployed [18, 19]. Further, existing proposals lack a clear partial deployment pathway [12, 13], failing to take into
account limitations imposed by different network actors in the wide area network, such as strict header format checking
1The total number of active Tor users is currently about 3 million users [6], a figure that is far from the number of active Internet users, which is, by even
conservative estimates, more than 3 billion users [7].
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of Internet Protocol (IP) and transport layers by routers and middleboxes [20, 21]. Previous anonymity solutions [11–15]
are implemented and tested only on software switches.
Our work is inspired by light-weight anonymity solutions (such as LAP [11]); however, in this paper, we pursue
an entirely different angle to anonymity systems, motivated by the observation that hardware switches are pervasive
in the Internet and offer a high performance and port density [22]. We present Practical Anonymity at the NEtwork
Level (PANEL), a partially-deployable, low-latency, light-weight anonymity system compatible with both software and
hardware switching. In particular, PANEL offers:
• Network-level light-weight anonymity: PANEL is implemented by Autonomous Systems (ASes) and embeds
light-weight anonymity into the Internet forwarding infrastructure. This obviates the need for a dedicated overlay
and can provide ubiquitous communication privacy to users by default. Further, it mitigates the undesirable scrutiny
drawn by the opt-in nature of overlay systems [23].
• Partial deployability and compatibility with legacy network: PANEL provides a practical approach for de-
ployability: it divides ASes on the communication path into PANEL-protected segments and legacy segments. ASes
in a single PANEL segment are at liberty to choose the anonymization method from existing proposals [10–15].
However, on the boundary of a PANEL segment, designated border routers (referred to as landmark routers)
transform packets to standard IP and transport format with fixed size headers, and forward these packets to the
legacy network. Also, in PANEL the end-to-end path is decided by each hop individually (hop-by-hop routing).
• Transparency: As demonstrated in Section 5, PANEL is transparent to end hosts and does not require client-side
(or server-side) modifications.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
(1) We propose the first anonymity protocol designed for and tested on high-performance hardware switching fabric,
offering low overhead and partial deployment.
(2) We propose a technique, that we refer to as privacy preserving line-rate source information hiding. As discussed
in Section 4.1, this technique involves three main steps: (1) source address rewriting, (2) source information
normalization (i.e., randomization of IP identification field and TCP initial sequence number), and (3) hiding path
information (i.e., time-to-live randomization). Among these steps, source address rewriting based on software-
switches has been mentioned in an earlier work [14]. However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
implement privacy preserving source address rewriting based on hardware switches.
(3) We implement a prototype of the proposed protocol using a high-performance programmable hardware switch
(Barefoot Tofino switch [24]) and P4 [25] programming language.
(4) We comprehensively evaluate our prototype and examine its validity and performance for different applications,
such as web browsing and Skype video calls. Our empirical results suggest that that high-performance (line-rate)
sender anonymity is achievable in today’s Internet, using high-performance hardware switches.
This study sheds light on potential advantages of high-performance hardware switching for anonymity solutions,
paving the way for further exploration in this area.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss design goals in Section 2, present an overview of PANEL
in Section 3 and our design in Section 4. The evaluation of our PANEL prototype appears in Section 5, followed by a
discussion of related work in Section 6, a discussion of limitations and potential extensions to PANEL in Section 7 and
finally a conclusion in Section 8.
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Drop rate
IPv4 [20, 26] 30% - 70%
IPv6 [27] 50% - 90%
Table 1. IPv4 and IPv6 packet drop rate according to different measurement experiments [20, 26, 27].
2 DESIGN GOALS
In this section, we outline the basic design goals of our protocol, including the privacy properties we aim to achieve. In
Section 1, we highlighted partial deployment and compatibility with hardware switching fabrics as the two major factors
towards practical deployment of network-level anonymity solutions. We address these issues in previous proposals and
showcase a solution that is compatible with the legacy IP network, is designed to run on hardware switches, and achieves
anonymity properties while being transparent to end hosts.
2.1 Compatibility with Legacy IP Network
We allow legacy and PANEL networks to coexist, enabling a partial deployment model. Here, we discuss desired properties
that allow partial deployment of PANEL, which differentiates it from prior work [11–13, 15, 16].
Standard Compliance: A number of prior proposals are based on packet-carrying state model [11, 13, 15], in which
session information is encoded in packet headers. However, carrying entire state information in packet headers proves to
be impractical in the legacy network for the following reasons:
• First, while IPv4 [28] and IPv6 [29] allow for IP options in the header, in practice support for these fields is very
limited in today’s deployed networks. Table 1 summarizes the drop rate of packets containing IP options on the
Internet, as reported by different measurement studies [20, 26, 27]. The alternative approach of carrying state in
transport and application layer headers also faces deployment challenges: (1). Considering the transport layer, the
TCP options field is bounded in length (maximum of 40 bytes) and different protocols compete for that limited
space [21]. (2). The fate of new experimental options are unknown due to pervasiveness of middleboxes enforcing
transport and application layer policies [30]. Also, embedding routing state information into application layer
space exposes packets to the risk of being dropped by network firewalls that monitor application layer semantics.
• Second, packet-carrying state can leak information about the identity of the user, or the end-to-end route, unless
routing information is encrypted. However, we avoid assuming that line-rate packet encryption is available at all
landmark routers, for practical purposes.
PANEL aims to be compliant with protocol standards as well as the support offered by today’s deployed networks.
Thus, PANEL does not use the packet-carrying state model and only adds a constant size small tag to the IP headers for
packets sent to the legacy network.
Routing Compatibility: The source-controlled routing model, which many previous works are based on [12, 13],
provides a means to allow sessions sender to determine or influence the routing path. However, source-controlled routing
and its variants such as pathlet routing [31], are not ready for end-to-end deployment, due to unresolved incentive and
security concerns [32]. Therefore, PANEL operates in the hop-by-hop routing model, where routing decisions are made
independently by each landmark router. Also, PANEL allows for asymmetric routes between PANEL segments and for
intra-segment routing, as discussed in Section 4.
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2.2 Hardware Switching
The forwarding capacity and port density of hardware switching fabrics make them an indispensable part of the networking
ecosystem from data centers and service providers to large enterprise networks [22]. The advent of programmable
switching fabrics [24, 33–35] and the abstractions provided by high-level programming languages supporting them [25],
have enabled researchers to prototype and experiment with new protocols on hardware switching fabric for the first time.
A network switch often consists of a switching chip that acts as the fast forwarding plane, often called data plane,
and a slower control plane with a richer instruction set (e.g. x86 CPU). Similar to OpenFlow [36] the fast data plane
can communicate with the control plane via an API. Programmable data plane fabrics implement primitives such as
match+action tables and limited stateful packet manipulation, which are mapped to a high-level language specifications,
such as P4. Our design challenge was to work within the constraints of the language and the specific switching fabric
utilized to modify packets at line-rate, which we further discuss in Section 4.2.
2.3 Privacy Properties
The privacy properties discussed below form the basis of our design. We note that in our design we consider the trade-off
between privacy guarantees and feasibility of deployment for our solution, thus our design falls into the category of
light-weight anonymity solutions [11].
• Anonymity: A user, server, or a session is anonymous if it is not identifiable within an anonymity set, i.e., a set of
entities with similar features [37]. In our light-weight anonymity model, we only provide sender anonymity, which
implies that the initiating party of a communication session must remain anonymous.
• Unlinkability: The unlinkability property indicates that the chances of linking elements in the system (e.g., sessions
and messages) is bounded by the a-priori knowledge of the observer, even after observing the system [37, 38].
Given the capabilities of an adversary, if two sessions are unlinkable, no amount of observation from that adversary
should increase his confidence that these two sessions are related.
• Path Information Protection: Adding multiple layers of mixing can increase the potential anonymity set, an
idea first described by Chaum [39] and one that has been used in multiple settings [40, 41]. In our design, every
additional PANEL segment adds a layer of mixing. However, topology-based analysis of packets with path
information leakage can defeat the privacy benefits of iterative mixing (see Section 5.5 in [13] for more detail).
Therefore, PANEL ensures that packet headers do not leak path information, including path length.
3 OVERVIEW AND ENVIRONMENT
In this section, we first present a brief overview of PANEL design, then discuss the network environment and threat
model.
3.1 Overview
A PANEL deployment is comprised of multiple PANEL segments, each of which contains one or more ASes. PANEL only
dictates the behavior of landmark routers interfacing with the next segment and routing decisions internal to a segment
are not defined by PANEL. Fig. 1 shows an end-to-end session from sender (client) to receiver (server). In direction
1, packet headers are rewritten at the boundary of the PANEL segment to achieve anonymity and session unlinkability.
Each landmark router rewrites the source addresses in packet headers and replaces them with local addresses. Session
identifiers are also replaced with randomized identifiers, called tags. The original address and session identifier, along
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Fig. 1. High level overview of PANEL: Packets for an end-to-end session from sender to receiver pass through a number of
PANEL segments and legacy segments. Packet are rewritten at landmark routers in both directions, from sender to receiver
(Direction 1) and from destination to source (Direction 2). In each PANEL segment, routing and packet format are decided by
the segment, thus asymmetric routing can be supported internally and in legacy segments.
with other session information (such as segment-specific information), are stored at landmark routers. For the return path
from the server to the client, each landmark, retrieves information stored locally and rewrites the headers in return packets
in reverse direction. Thus, our work demonstrates two important ideas. First, that source information rewriting is sufficient
to provide sender anonymity and session unlinkability in today’s Internet. Second, PANEL achieves these properties at
line-rate using existing abstractions available in programmable network devices with no client side modification.
As we will discuss in Section 4.3, this approach forces the return route to uses the same set of landmark ASes in the
reverse order and we will further discuss the implications for participating ASes in Section 7.4. However, as shown in
Fig. 1, PANEL allows for asymmetric routes in the legacy network and internally in each segment.
3.2 Environment and Threat Model
An adversary’s goal is to break the sender-anonymity or unlinkability properties of PANEL or reduce the anonymity set,
as described in Section 2.3. Thus, PANEL provides these privacy properties against session receiver, every Autonomous
System (AS) and passive or active eavesdroppers that are capable of observing, dropping, replaying and modifying
packets either on the path or in compromised routers. We allow adversaries with a partial view of the network and those
which are only capable of observing and controlling only a portion of ASes on the path. Similar to real-time anonymity
systems such as Tor [5], global adversaries and end-to-end timing analysis are outside the scope of PANEL [42, 43].
To ensure PANEL is transparent to end-hosts, we delegate the task of protecting user privacy to the Autonomous
Systems. PANEL provides privacy benefits even with a single AS deployment, however, additional PANEL ASes on an
end-to-end path increase the anonymity set and improve session privacy. In the absence of other network-level anonymity
solutions such as Dovetail [12] or Phi [15], this means that the first PANEL-AS must be trusted, reducing our adversary
model to that of the light-weight anonymity protocols [11]. We assume the interface between a PANEL segment and
legacy network is defined by Internet Protocol (IPv4 [28] or IPv6 [29]).
Finally, while payload encryption and more advance privacy preserving mechanisms such as onion routing [44] can
help improve the confidentiality of content and metadata, we do not require that PANEL landmark routers support
encryption at line-rate. Thus, PANEL leaves these functionalities to application and transport layers [5, 45, 46], in order
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Fig. 2. Source information rewriting in IPv4 network: a packet originating from the sender (1) is transformed in the first
PANEL segment (2), with its source address and TTL randomized. The source IP address chosen at each landmark is from
the PANEL IP pool. The packet is then forwarded in the legacy segment (3) as a standard IP packet. Additional PANEL
segments (4) further anonymize the packet source by replacing its source address.
not to overburden PANEL routers with cryptographic requirements, simplifying the deployment of PANEL on existing
routers that do not support such capabilities at line-rate.
4 PANEL DESIGN
In this section, we explain how we achieve anonymity and session unlinkability on programmable switches. Our design
is heavily influenced by our objective to make PANEL practical and deployable in today’s Internet and applicability to
primitives on programmable hardware switching fabric, such as match-action tables [22]. Also, we demonstrate how our
design is compatible with legacy networks both in terms of routing and packet header format.
4.1 Privacy Preserving Line-rate Source Information Hiding
This section describes how to achieve anonymity through in-network source information hiding, based on the primitives
available in programmable switching chips.
4.1.1 Source Address Rewriting. While the idea of source address rewriting is not novel, we are the first to
demonstrate how to achieve privacy preserving source address rewriting at line-rate on hardware switching fabric, without
relying on overlay proxies. Thus, a major contribution of PANEL is to demonstrate that sender anonymity through source
rewriting is achievable in today’s Internet, using high performance switching chips.
Fig. 2 shows how the concealment the origin of packets is made possible through source information rewriting on a
per-session basis. First, each landmark AS sets aside a subnet of public IP addresses, called PANEL (IP address) pool,
which will be advertised through BGP and will be used to replace the source IP addresses for all sessions. A session
on route from source to destination is modified at each landmark PANEL router, replacing the source address with an
IP address from the PANEL pool. As we will see in Section 4.3.1, the IP address is chosen at random using a Pseudo
Random Number Generator (PRNG). In Fig. 2, an instantiation of source rewriting is shown based on IPv4 addressing.
For each packet, the source address is rewritten at each landmark router and packet is sent to the legacy network where
the routing and forwarding take place without any changes in the legacy network.
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Fig. 3. Modified TCP/IP header: PANEL modifies headers in IP and transport layers (TCP). Source IP address and port
number fields are used to place randomized tags. IPv4 identification field and TCP sequence numbers are normalized to
thwart passive fingerprinting attacks. Finally, TTL (Hop Limit) field is randomized.
4.1.2 Source Information Normalization. Several fields in packet headers can be utilized to perform fingerprinting
attacks. In the presence of passive adversaries, IP identification field and TCP initial sequence number (shown in Fig. 3)
reveal information about clients’ software. These fields are implemented using different algorithms on popular operating
systems [47–49] and exploiting these fields to identify clients or to link different sessions of a user is a well known
technique [50, 51]. Thus, the first landmark router normalizes these fields in packets to minimize the chances of such
attacks. The landmark router must ensure that it is the first PANEL segment on the path between sender to receivers2.
Upon establishment of a session on a landmark router, a random offset is generated for each of the fields that will be
added in one direction and subtracted in the reverse direction.
4.1.3 Hiding Path Information. In the legacy IP network, time to live (TTL) or hop limit field in packet headers also
leaks information about the distance to the original sender at any given vantage point. Assume that the initial TTL value
Ti is a fixed constant c. If an adversary observes a specific TTL value δ , then he can readily calculate the hop distance (d)
to the packet sender. Furthermore, through pre-computation on the AS-level topology, the adversary can narrow down the
list of ASes where this packet could have originated from. This can be detrimental to the iterative mixing property of
PANEL, discussed in Section 2.3. Therefore, the initial TTL value Ti must be randomized by a landmark router, as shown
in Fig. 3. To determine the probability distribution for TTL values, we use mutual information to quantify the information
leakage for a distance d , through observing value δ . We assume d is chosen from a distribution D and our objective is to
find a distribution ∆, such that Ti ’s chosen from this distribution leak the least information about the distance to source at
any given vantage point. Thus, our objective function is the following:
minimize
∆
I (∆ − D;∆)
subject to supp(∆) = {Tmin , . . . ,Tmax }.
(1)
Where I is the mutual information function, supp(∆i ) is the range of possible values for Ti ’s and Tmin and Tmax are
minimum and maximum values that the initial TTL value can take. Note that, by definition, the initial TTL has to have an
upper bound (Tmax ). Also, it cannot be set to zero and has to be large enough such that packets on long end-to-end paths
do not expire, thus a positive Tmin is needed (e.g. 64). We will discuss in Section 5.5 how to empirically estimate D and
how to compute the distribution ∆.
2If the packet is not originated in the same segment as the landmark router, the router can check whether the packet’s source address belongs to a PANEL
segment, by consulting a global list of IP addresses of PANEL segments.
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Fig. 4. Once the first packet for a session arrives at the switch (1), the packet is sent to a local CPU or a specialized chip
(2), where a random tag is generated for that session (3). The tag along with session information are inserted into the
forward table (4). Finally, the packet is modified and forwarded to the destination (5). Subsequent packets for this session
are matched and modified in the forward table, stored in the switch data plane (6).
4.2 Session Unlinkability with Randomization
To achieve session unlinkability, session identifiers, such as TCP ports, are randomized in PANEL. There are two
challenges with randomizing session identifiers. First session identifiers must fit into small fixed size header space to
be compatible with legacy network. Second, we do not assume that per session asymmetric cryptography is available at
every landmark router, so routers must assign session identifiers independently. Therefore, we replace session identifiers
with the output of a cryptographic pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), called “tags". As shown in Fig. 4, we
assume that a local agent or an external chip on the router generates these random tags for each new incoming session and
guarantees that active tags are not reused. The tag is split and stored in lower bits of the source address and transport
layer port numbers and further parts of IP and transport headers, when needed (discussed further in Section 4.3.1). Using
secure random number generation guarantees that packet tags are independent of each other and provide tag bitwise
unlinkability [52]. Once a tag is assigned to a session, the tag and the corresponding source information is stored in a
key-value table, referred to as forward table and each subsequent packet will be matched by its source information (key)
to retrieve its corresponding tag (value), as shown in Fig. 5. Then the packet will be rewritten similar to the first packet
using a match-action functionality available in programmable switching fabric [22]. As we will discuss in Section 5.2, in
our current implementation key sizes are reduced using a hash function in the data plane.
4.3 Forwarding Responses in Absence of Return Addresses
Since routing on the Internet is based on the destination addresses, removing original source addresses at landmark nodes
makes routing response packets challenging. Here, we describe how our design overcomes this challenge.
To be able to route the response, a landmark router must store the original session information. This information is
stored in another table, referred to as reverse table. Reverse table is a look-up table that conceptually applies the reverse
actions of forward table. Fig. 6 illustrates this translation in an asymmetric routing scenario.
4.3.1 Match-Action Translation. Thus far, we have established that in PANEL, fixed size tags are placed in packet
headers at every landmark node to identify sessions and sources in the absence of original headers and these tags are
placed in the TCP/UDP port numbers and lower bits of IP address field. We apply tags to sessions through match-action
tables [22], referred to as forward and reverse tables in the data plane of the router, as shown in Fig. 7. Upstream3 packets
3 We refer to sessions from the source to the destination as upstream flows and the return sessions as downstream flows.
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control ingress { 
  //Check if packet is a valid IPv4 packet
  if(valid(ipv4)){ 
    //Check if TTL is larger than 0
    if(ipv4.ttl > 0) {
      //Check if dest IPv4 address belongs to us
      apply(match_panel_ip)
      {
          hit { 
          //Apply reverse tables 
            if(valid(tcp)) {
              apply(rev_panel_tcp);
            }
            if(valid(udp)) {
              apply(rev_panel_udp);
            }
          }
        } 
        //If packet's IPv4 address does not belong to  
        //us, apply forward tables 
        if(panel_metadata.match_panel == 0) {
          //Assume all sessions are matched 
          if(valid(tcp)) {
            apply(fwd_panel_tcp);
          }
          if(valid(udp)) {
            apply(fwd_panel_udp);
          }
        }
      ... 
}
Fig. 5. Ingress pipline of PANEL written in P4 for IPv4 addresses. Packets matching an IP address that belongs to the switch,
will be handled by reverse tables, i.e. rev_panel_tcp or rev_panel_udp. Other packets are handled by forward tables,
i.e. fwd_panel_tcp or fwd_panel_udp.
A
B
Request AS1 AS2 AS4 AS5 
AS 1
AS2
AS5 
AS3
AS 4
165.22.2.22 128.112.224.44
172.217.10.142 172.217.10.142 172.217.10.142
165.22.3.14
X Y
YX
X Y
Src Addr
Dest Addr
Response AS1 AS3 AS4 AS5 
172.217.10.142 172.217.10.142
165.22.2.22 165.22.3.14 128.112.224.44
172.217.10.142 YX
X Y
Src Addr
Dest Addr
PANEL
Segment
Legacy
Segment
Fig. 6. When B sends a response to A, the return address of A is absent in the packet header. B knows that the request
packet passed through Y because of the source address of the request packet observed by B belongs to Y . Thus, B will
send its response to Y . Y receives this packet addressed to its landmark IP, checks its list of tags, and sees that the request
originated from X . When the response arrives at X , addressed to its landmark IP, X checks its list of tags, and sees that the
request was sent by A. Finally, the response has its destination IP address modified to the IP address of A and forwarded
from X to its final destination, A.
are tagged using a lookup table. The first packet of each session will hit the local agent or a customized chip for tag
generation, where tag is a unique identifier generated from a PRNG.
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Fig. 7. PANEL packet processing pipeline: if a session already exists in the forward table, the packet source information is
searched in the table (A) and corresponding tag is retrieved from the memory (B) and is applied to the packet header(C). If,
however, the session is not in the table, on the first packet of the flow, the local agent is queried (D) for a new tag. Once a free
tag is assigned to the session, the local agent updates the tables (E and F) to reflect the changes. For downstream packets
another match-action table, named reverse table is updated by the local agent to perform the reverse tagging operation,
which performs the operation described in Section 4.3.
4.4 Composition with other Anonymity Systems
Recall that PANEL provides only light-weight anonymity by focusing on sender anonymity, and omits receiver anonymity
and payload encryption from its design. By composing PANEL with other anonymity systems, we can augment the privacy
or performance properties of these solutions. For instance, Dovetail (discussed in Section 6) is a network-level anonymity
mechanism that provides receiver anonymity, thus, PANEL-Dovetail enables sender/receiver anonymity. Another example
is that of the Tor network, which is vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks if both the Tor guard and the Tor exit are malicious
and colluding. The composition of PANEL with Tor helps mitigate such traffic analysis attacks by protecting the identity
of clients from Tor guards. Below we showcase PANEL-Dovetail and PANEL-Tor:
PANEL-Dovetail: One of the advantages of the Tor network is that the end receiver for a Tor session does not have
to be part of the Tor overlay network. However, both Dovetail and HORNET require both the session sender and the
receiver to be part of the segment. As shown in Fig. 8, PANEL-Dovetail allows for a receiver outside the last segment.
Anonymity headers are added in the first segment and removed by the last segment similar to MPLS [53], enabling a
client to transparently access an end host through a PANEL-Dovetail deployment.
PANEL-Tor: The Tor anonymity network is still popular, despite the performance issues it is facing. A key challenge
in the Tor network is how to securely select the entry node (guard) for each client connecting to the network [54]. Since
Tor’s guard selection algorithm takes guards’ available bandwidth as an input, powerful adversaries can inject high
bandwidth guard nodes (and exit nodes) to compromise client anonymity. For example, such attackers can perform website
fingerprinting attacks or even end-to-end timing analysis attacks, if they can monitor or compromise the corresponding
Tor exit. With PANEL-Tor, however, guard nodes are no longer able to identify the client connecting to them, as shown in
Fig. 9.
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PANEL­Dovetail  
Segment 1
Client
PANEL­Dovetail  
Segment 2
Server
Dovetail Node
PANEL Landmark 
Legacy Segment
Unprotected Dovetail Path 
Protected Dovetail Path 
Dovetail Loop Path 
Fig. 8. PANEL-Dovetail: PANEL-Dovetail allows Dovetail sessions to be extended over multiple segments, with the first
segment establishing and end-to-end path from sender to the last PANEL-Dovetail segment landmark router. Thus, the last
landmark router acts as a transparent proxy for the client, decapsulating PANEL-Dovetail layers, similar to a Tor exit.
Tor Network
PANEL Landmark  Tor Guard  Tor Client 
PANEL Segment
Fig. 9. PANEL-Tor: A PANEL segment can protect the users connecting to the Tor network by hiding their identity
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the feasibility of our approach on programmable switches. We demonstrate our prototype
followed by an empirical study of the parameters in our design and an estimate of the anonymity size of our solution in
today’s Internet.
5.1 Hardware Implementation
Our implementation is based on a real-world Barefoot Tofino switch [24] with 3.3 Tbps forwarding capacity. PANEL’s
forwarding plane code is written in a) P4, which is a field reconfigurable, protocol and target independence programming
language designed as a platform for programming parse-match-action pipelines, through match-action tables in hardware,
and b) a local agent written in python, running on an Intel x86 CPU, which performs tag generation.
Our testbed consists of a server connected to the Tofino switch through a Mellanox ConnectX-3 dual-port 40GbE
network interface card. As shown in Fig. 10, each of the interfaces connected to the switch are isolated to a Linux
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Internet
Ethernet Bridge
eth3eth2
eth1
Test Server
Barefoot Tofino
1
2 3
Fig. 10. Experiment setup: Our test server is equipped with 3 Ethernet interfaces, each isolated to a single Linux namespace.
Eth1 and Eth2 are connected to the Tofino switch over a dual port network interface card. All traffic received on Eth2 is
forwarded to Eth3 interface that is connected to the Internet over a local Ethernet bridge.
namespace. Packets are passed through the switch via one Ethernet interface and received on the other interface. Finally,
each packet is forwarded to its destination on the Internet via a local Ethernet bridge.
5.2 Validation and Performance
(1) Validation: In order to demonstrate that PANEL runs transparent to clients and application-level protocols, we ran
two sets of experiments on our testbed using standard Ubuntu 16.04. First, we tested DNS, Web and TLS protocols
by fetching 100 different domains from Alexa top websites over both HTTP and HTTPS. Each page was fetched
with PANEL and vanilla routing software (simple router) and inspected visually to make sure the resulting pages
are identical. Also, we successfully accessed servers over a range of protocols, including FTP, SSH, POP3, SMTP,
Telnet and SMTP both with and without PANEL. Next, for real-time applications we tested Skype video calls. We
verified that calls are established and can last over 10 minutes.
(2) Throughput: Using iPerf4, we first measured the bandwidth of packet forwarding between the two interfaces
connected to the switch. These interfaces are hosted on the same network interface card that runs at 20 Gbps on
each port. The average bitrate over one minute experiments were 16.9 ± 0.38 Gbps and 16.2 ± 0.54 Gbps for
simple router and PANEL respectively, showing only a 5% bandwidth overhead. We repeated the same experiment
with a remote iPerf server, using the Ethernet bridge depicted in Fig. 10. The bandwidth limit in this case is dictated
by our upstream link to the Internet. For this experiment, simple router and PANEL respectively yield 127 ± 14
Mbps and 118 ± 22 Mbps bitrates. These experiments show that we can achieve close to 92-96% of the switch
capacity. Thus we expect that if we connect all the 32 ports on the Tofino switch to 100 Gbps interfaces, we can
achieve Tbps forwarding capacity.
(3) Latency: We measured the latency for the Skype experiment above. We repeated the Skype experiment 10 times
and measured the latency in the video received. As shown in Table 2, PANEL adds only 3% latency over simple
router for Skype calls. We also employed another method to measure latency incurred by PANEL. Using Gnu
Wget software we fetched 100 websites from Alexa5, 100 times each. Fig. 11 compares the latency of PANEL and
simple router for each of these 100 websites. We discuss how the majority of this latency occurs during the first
round trip in Appendix A.
(4) Switch Capacity: To understand the number of sessions our Tofino switch can keep in memory, match-action
tables with different key length were compiled on the switch, as shown in Fig. 12. If the switch had unlimited
memory, the (theoretical) bound for table sizes would grow exponentially with the key length, however, in practice
4https://iperf.fr
5https://www.alexa.com/topsites
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Fig. 11. Comparison of latency for Alexa top 100 domain over PANEL and simple router. This figure shows the latency to
fetch the front page of each domain.
Latency (millisecond)
Simple router 241.33 ± 31.14
PANEL 248 ± 52.40
Table 2. Skype video call latency in Simple router vs. PANEL.
the switch reaches the maximum capacity for keeping the entire table in the memory at key length of 21 bits.
Therefore, we use a hash function in the data plane to truncate the tag to match this key length.
5.3 Sessions Maintained by Routers
• How many sessions a router must maintain: To get an estimate of the number of sessions to expect on routers
on the Internet, we have analyzed CAIDA dataset from 20166. The dataset is published every 3 months, consisting
of one-hour long anonymized packet headers for an Internet backbone link, operating at 10 Gbps. Our analysis
shows that on average there are 6,206,033 concurrent source IP and source TCP port tuples for the duration of an
hour.
• How much memory do these sessions require: For each IPv4 session, instead of using all possible combinations
of source IP address and port as table keys, PANEL uses a hash function to reduce the addressing space of the
6http://www.caida.org/data/passive/passive_2016_dataset.xml
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Fig. 12. Tofino switch capacity: Table sizes with unlimited memory (theoretical bound) shown in red and the maximum table
size allowed on the Tofino switch (practical bound) for each key size, shown in blue. For key lengths less than or equal to 21,
the theoretical bound matches the practical bound, but after the 21 bit key length, we reach the SRAM memory limit on the
switch and the practical bound starts to degrade.
memory used to store session mappings. Truncating the output of the hash function to 24 bits, yields more than 16
million possible entries (an upper bound for the number of concurrent sessions we observed in the CAIDA dataset).
For each entry in the match-action table, PANEL stores 4 bytes of original IP address and 2 bytes of original source
port. Thus, the total memory required for forward mapping is 96 MB. Similarly for reverse direction the same
amount of memory is required, adding up to 192 MB for all entries.
• How many public IPv4 addresses are needed: To compute the number of unique IPv4 address needed to map
all sessions in the memory, we first computed the maximum number of concurrent TCP sessions observed in the
data as an estimate for the number of sessions to be stored. Dividing this number by 65,536, i.e., the total number
of ports available shows that we need about 100 different public facing IP addresses for this router to run our
protocol with aging out occurring every hour. Note that the estimates from these traces are conservative estimates,
since most routers will see fewer sessions.
5.4 Size of Anonymity Set
Previous network-level anonymity proposals only considered number of IPv4 addresses assigned to an AS [11, 13] or
IP prefix size distribution [14] for quantifying anonymity. This approach does not take into consideration the number
of active IP addresses and overestimates the AS sizes. We, on the other hand, take an active measurement approach
to address this limitation. To study anonymity size associated with each service provider on the Internet, we count the
number of active clients on each service provider. To this end, we consider the number of active IPv4 addresses as a
lower bound of active hosts in each service provider. Previous research shows that a combination of active scans on
ZMap [55] platform and data observed by Content Distribution Network (CDN) vantage points can provide an estimate
for the number of active IPv4 addresses [56]. However, there is no breakdown by service provider in previous research.
For our purposes, we used Censys [57], a platform that captures and processes Internet-wide scanning datasets (using
ZMap-based scans) of multiple protocols, such as ICMP reachability, identifying DNS resolvers and HTTP(S) server.
Using Censys we queried the aggregated database of scans for 10 days in July 2018 and on average found over 156
million active IPv4 addresses that responded to Censys queries. We then found the AS numbers associated with these IP
addresses.
Fig. 13a shows that the total number of IPv4 addresses assigned to each AS is on average 50532 ± 989326 Also, as
shown in Fig. 13b, the number of active IPv4 addresses per AS is on average 2448 ± 50794. We also compared the
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Fig. 13. The histogram of the total number of IPv4 addresses assigned to each AS is shown in Fig. 13a followed by the
histogram of the number of active IPv4 addresses per AS, shown in Fig. 13b. Note that the horizontal axis is logarithmic.
Finally, the percentage of active IPv4 addresses over the number of IPv4 addresses allocated for the AS is shown in Fig. 13c
percentage of active IPv4 addresses over total number of IPv4 address assigned to a single AS in Fig. 13c, with an average
value of 8%. While this is a lower bound, Using the data from measurement studies that showed 25% of hosts on the
Internet responded to ping request (see section 5 of [58]), we estimate that 32% of assigned IPv4 addresses are active.
This indicates that there is adequate vacant IP addresses that can be utilized for PANEL IP address pool.
Finally, To understand how the anonymity set size increases with more ASes implementing PANEL, we assumed that
the first two ASes implement our protocol and compute the total anonymity set. For this purpose, we chose Alexa 1000
top domains and their corresponding AS numbers and chose top 1000 ASes based on CAIDA AS ranking7. We then used
CAIDA AS relationship database8 to infer an end-to-end path for sessions originating from the top ASes (source) to the
top domains (destination). Using this inferred path, we computed the sum of the total number of IPv4 addresses assigned
to the first two ASes in Fig. 14a (140989 ± 142523) and the total number of active IPv4 addresses in Fig.14b (average of
3266 ± 2921). These graphs indicate that the total number of IP addresses assigned and the total number of IP addresses
that are active can increase by a factor of 2.79 and 1.3 respectively, if two consecutive ASes implement PANEL.
7http://as-rank.caida.org/about
8http://www.caida.org/data/as-relationships/
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Fig. 14. The number of total IPv4 addresses assigned to each two consecutive ASes is shown in 14b and the number of
active IPv4 addresses in each two consecutive ASes is shown in 14b.
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Fig. 15. Hop distance distribution from vantage points for country Japan is shown in Fig. 15a. The optimized TTL distribution
computed based on this distribution is shown in Fig. 15b.
.
5.5 Distance Distribution for TTL Obfuscation
In Section 4.1.3, we used a distribution to randomize the initial TTL values used by PANEL. In order to estimate that
distribution, we first approximated the hop distance to Alexa top 1000 domains. We used RIPE Atlas traceroutes9, a
global network that enables customized active traceroute scans. We collect traceroute data from 3 different vantage points
within each country (repeated 10 times) then computed empirical frequency of distance shown in Fig. 15a. Then, using
the equation 1 from Section 4.1.3, we found initial TTL distribution by solving the minimal mutual information equation
(Fig. 15b).
6 RELATED WORK
Network-level anonymity solutions can be broadly categorized into two different classes: 1) enterprise and local-area
networks, and 2) wide-area networks.
Enterprise and local networks: In this category, the scope of the anonymity solution is a single enterprise, local
network or autonomous system, where all the networking infrastructure is controlled by a centralized authority. For
instance, PHEAR [59] replaces identifying information in packet headers with flat tags, which are securely communicated
9https://atlas.ripe.net
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to individual hosts using a centralized SDN controller. However, this solution requires client side modification. iTap [60]
takes a similar approach and eliminates the need for a client side software patch.
Wide-area network: PANEL operates in the wide-area network model, thus the following contenders bear more
similarity to our design. The Address Hiding Protocol (AHP) [14] proposes a NAT-like design, which aims to accommodate
forensics needs by making flow associations reversible, using a cryptographic solution. However, their solution lacks
session unlinkability, does not consider legacy network compatibility and makes it difficult for clients in enlisted ISPs
to host services. Tor instead of IP [10] proposed replacing BGP speaking routers with onion routers and rendezvous
mailboxes. While embedding onion routing into the network layer would provide both sender and receiver anonymity, the
approach demands expensive operations at line-rate and is also based on source-controlled routing.
Lightweight Anonymity and Privacy (LAP) [11] aims to protect end-host’s identity from servers. In LAP, the first AS
is trusted, similar to the PANEL design. However, forwarding information is carried in each packet, with the potential for
packet headers to grow arbitrarily large. Also, each AS has to encrypt and verify its own forwarding information as packets
pass through the network, performing a symmetric key operation per packet at each hop, as opposed to our solution that
only requires a table look-up for packet forwarding. Dovetail [12] extends LAP to provide sender-receiver anonymity,
with the help of a third party node called matchmaker. A client using Dovetail forwards its traffic to the matchmaker and
notifies the matchmaker node about the final destination, using public key encryption. Then the sender chooses the final
path among a number of paths proposed by the matchmaker. Both LAP and Dovetail leak the location of individual ASes
in an end-to-end path between sender and receiver. PHI [15], aims to solve this problem with a randomized path-segment
positioning algorithm.
HORNET [13] offers security and privacy on par with Tor instead of IP, providing an onion encryption with every
hop between the two ends of a session. Moreover, forward and return paths can be distinct in HORNET and information
leakage about the length of the path and the location of each AS on the path is minimized. However, HORNET assumes
that an end-to-end path is known to the sender, where the sender establishes a key for each individual session with every
forwarding node on the path, using public key operations. Also, similar to Dovetail and PHI, HORNET lacks a clear
partial deployment plan and is a source-controlled routing solution, which makes it difficult to deploy in the current
Internet. Finally, TARANET [16], improves HORNET, adding traffic analysis resilience through a traffic normalization
technique called end-to-end traffic shaping. While TARANET has strong anonymity guarantees, its bandwidth and latency
overhead are higher than other network-level anonymity proposal. Table 3 summaries the differences between wide-area
anonymity solutions.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss PANEL’s limitations, extensions for header and payload encryption, the challenges posed by IP
address spoofing, implications for participating ASes, and comparison to carrier-grade NATs.
7.1 Limitations
While the design of PANEL provides several attractive properties including partial deployment and being based on
hardware switching, it does have several limitations, which we discuss next.
• First Round Time Trip Delay: Recall that session initiation in PANEL engages an external CPU/Controller
which incurs an extra overhead as shown in Section 5.2. The P4 specification [61] allows for external hardware to
implement customized functions, such as our session initiation algorithm and performs the operations at line-rate.
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LAP [11] # G# #  # # # #
HORNET [13] # # # #  #   
TARANET [16] # G# # #  #   
Dovetail [12] # G# # #  #   
PHI [15] # # #   #  #
Tor Instead of IP [10] # # # #  # #  
Enlisting ISPs [14] # G#   # G# # #
PANEL     #   #
Table 3. Related work comparison. Symbols  , G# ,# indicate full, partial and no implementation in the solution respectively.
Platforms such as NetFPGA10 can be used for a full hardware implementation of PANEL, which will reduce the
latency overhead in the first round trip of the communication session.
• First AS Trust: PANEL is a light-weight anonymity protocol, as mentioned in Section 3.2. This implies that
protocol operations are performed by PANEL ASes, and the first AS has to be the point of trust. However, trusting
the first AS can lead to privacy concerns. Users requiring stronger privacy can still benefit from the composition of
PANEL with the Tor network, as discussed in Section 4.4.
• Tag Placement: The number of sessions a PANEL router can serve is bounded by the number of bits in packet
headers allocated for session tags. Relying only on the port number and lower bits of the IP address might be
insufficient for router with large forwarding tables, since it increases the chances of collision. To extend tags for
IPv4 sessions, we can leverage the literature in IP packet marking, where the goal is to embed information in
packets to be able to identify them later in upstream hops [62]. IPv6, on the other hand, provides a much larger
address space for this purpose.
• TCP Fingerprintability: The variance between TCP implementations on different operating systems allows an
adversary to fingerprint clients’ operating systems [63]. To obfuscate subtle differences in TCP state transition or
advertised TCP window sizes, a PANEL segment must employ network-layer security protocols such as IPSec.
Thus, TCP fingerprinting remains a limitation of PANEL and segments may choose to use more heavy-weight
network-level anonymity solutions that also protect against timing analysis, such as TARANET [16] with higher
overhead.
10https://github.com/NetFPGA/P4-NetFPGA-public
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7.2 Header and Payload Encryption
We recognize that the advances in the field of networking will allow us to expand PANEL’s feature set. For instance, we
discuss how to use line-rate encryption to remove state from landmark routers.
Routing Encryption: Encrypting routing information is rather expensive to perform at line-rate and it is not currently
supported by many routers. However, if routers are equipped with a cryptographic co-processors, our design can be
extended to encrypt local routing decisions and replace tags generated using PRNGs in packet headers, as discussed in
Section 4.3.1. Furthermore, currently the existence of a particular tag in upstream and downstream packets indicates that
they belong to the same end-to-end session. If public key encryption is possible at packet level, tags in packet headers can
be encrypted using routers’ public keys to provide unlinkability between packets in different directions for a session.
Payload Encryption: PANEL neither modifies the payload of packets nor does it perform onion encryption. We
believe that payload encryption should be addressed in higher layers, such as IPSec or HTTPS [46]. Nevertheless, payload
encryption, if possible at line-rate, can help improve anonymity and unlinkability.
7.3 Address Spoofing and Abuse Mitigation
Address Spoofing: IP address spoofing entails an attacker using an IP address not belonging to its address space as the
source of spoofed packets. PANEL routers store per-session state in forward and reverse tables, and an adversary can
exhaust the memory on the router. A session is determined by the source IP address and its tag (consider the port number
as part of the tag). This enables an adversary to have another attack vector namely tag spoofing, in which the adversary
can change tags while keeping IP address persistent to amplify the attack.
A general solution for tag spoofing is to rate limit tag generation in the first landmark AS. For orchestrated DDoS
attacks, we envision filtering based on the characteristics of the attack [64]. There are also a number of filtering approaches
based on characteristics of sessions, such as congestion feedback systems based on destination [65] or capability-based
solutions [66–68].
Abuse Mitigation: Since PANEL removes source information from sessions, a server under Denial of Service (DoS)
attack does not have any means to filter out connections based on their source address. Thus, we envision a STOP
mechanism by which an AS hosting a server can request the first landmark (whose identity must be kept secret due to
iterative path mixing) on the path of a session to block certain sessions, on behalf of the victim of the DoS attack. In the
absence of return address for a PANEL packet, an AS can use the same packet header, to send this STOP request back
to the first PANELsegment. To prove that the STOP packet is generated by the end host’s AS, we assume there exist a
PKI scheme for Autonomous Systems similar to S-BGP [69]. Using its private key, the last AS signs a STOP message
and sends it with the same session tag to the first landmark, which in turn will terminate an abusive sender, an approach
similar to StopIt [70] and AITF [71].
7.4 Implications for Participating ASes
One incentive for ASes to deploy PANEL would be to pitch privacy as a differentiating factor, similar to how today’s web
browsers are pitching privacy to attract users [72]. Below, we discuss the cost implications for participating ASes.
Equipment Costs: Equipment costs scale with the number of sessions an AS has to handle. An AS can choose to cap
the number of external sessions it anonymizes. This presents an interesting trade-off between the anonymity set size and
economic cost, since larger number of supported sessions lead to a larger anonymity set size, albeit with a higher cost.
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Limited IP Addresses: The challenge of a limited number of publicly available IP addresses, especially for IPv4
addresses, can be addressed by having a PANEL segment share a pool of public IP addresses, and using ILNP [73] style
location identifier to forward packets to the appropriate router, where the PANEL session mapping is stored.
Asymmetric routing costs: Forwarding return packets in asymmetric routes increases the bill for an AS. However, an
AS can lower this extra cost by capping the number of external sessions it anonymizes. We also note that ASes have the
strongest incentives to support the privacy of their direct customers. Thus, the connections of these users can be prioritized
in this process.
Reputation costs: An AS can be flagged as untrustworthy for forwarding abusive sessions not originating from that
AS. The design of abuse mitigation systems [74, 75] is currently an open question for all anonymous communication
systems (even those based on overlay mechanisms, such as the Tor network).
7.5 Comparison to Carrier-grade NAT
Historically, network address translation (NAT) [76] has been widely used to work around the challenge of a limited
number of IPv4 addresses. As this problem has become more acute in recent years, Internet service providers have started
deploying carrier-grade NAT (CGN), also known as large-scale NAT, across their networks. CGNs allow a small pool of
public IPv4 addresses to be shared among many hosts and customers, by placing the NAT logic on a service provider’s
access network, rather than the subscriber’s edge network. Therefore, CGN shifts the NAT function from the customer
premises to the service provider network.
We note that the CGNs themselves provide very basic anonymity properties, by multiplexing multiple hosts and
customers via shared IPv4 addresses. The design of PANEL indeed shares some similarities with CGNs, and builds upon
the basic anonymity properties they provide. However, PANEL also differs from CGNs in several important ways.
First, PANEL rewrites source information in a more rigorous and holistic manner than CGNs, including normalizing IP
identification field, normalizing TCP initial sequence number, and hiding path information via time-to-live randomization.
Furthermore, the mappings between sessions and session identifiers (tags) in PANEL are not chosen deterministically,
but are chosen in a randomized manner using a PRNG as described in Section 4.2. In contrast, such mappings (session
outbound ports) in CGNs are deterministic. As shown by prior work, this determinism can be used to link sessions of
users, especially in the case of permissive (full cone) NAT, which is quite prevalent in design of CGNs [77].
Second, PANEL uses iterative path mixing to further enhance anonymity, via protocol deployment at multiple PANEL
segments in an end-to-end communication path between a client and server.
Third, PANEL does not act as a multiplexer of internal destinations and thus, does not impose the kind of restriction
that classical NATs place on network endpoints behind a NAT. For instance, in our design, a client can use the address of
a server located in a landmark segment directly to access it. In fact, we argue that there need to be enough IP addresses
allocated to individual hosts. Furthermore, PANEL explicitly mandates that service providers do not log the mapping
between internal endpoint and global tags as discussed in Section 4.
PANEL also shares a number of common challenges with CGNs [78]. First, for scalability, both need to maintain device
throughput and line-rate packet processing. Moreover, resource management, such as memory used to keep sessions state
or IP pool size (number of public facing IPs) is also a key component of design for both technologies. There are a number
of best practices around designing CGNs and protocols that interact with them [79] and studies have shown the result
of these practices in different providers [77]. Some of the techniques for DoS mitigation such as ingress filtering [80],
TCP/UDP timeout are lessons applicable to both PANEL and CGNs.
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8 CONCLUSIONS
In order to address one of the most challenging impediments that network-level anonymity proposals face (namely,
deployability), we introduced PANEL .
The proposed approach is sufficiently simple to be implemented using primitives available in programmable hardware
switches: we prototyped PANEL on a real-world Barefoot Tofino switch using P4 [25] network programming language.
PANEL offers (1) partial deployability, (2) low-latency, and (3) transparency (i.e., it does not require client-side or
server-side modifications).
Our analyses demonstrate that PANEL offers a high throughput (96% of the actual throughput of the switch), low-
latency overhead (e.g., 3% overhead in Skype calls), and satisfactory anonymity set at the cost of a reasonable storage
overhead (192 MB).
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Fig. 16. Comparison of TCP handshake latency for Alexa top 100 domain over PANEL and simple router. This graph shows
the time to complete a TCP three-way handshake for each domain.
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A APPENDIX A.
A.1 TCP Handshake Latency
This next experiment shows that this overhead is mostly introduced in the first packets of each session: we established
1000 TCP sessions to each of the above mentioned websites over TCP port 80 and measured the time it took to complete
the TCP handshake. As shown in Fig. 16, for simple router, the average time to complete the TCP handshake was 18.22
millisecond per session. In contrast, the average time to complete the TCP handshake was 152.16 millisecond per session
for PANEL, showing an 8 fold increase in the first round trip. This overhead can be reduced substantially once the PANEL
session establishment logic is moved to a full hardware implementation, as opposed to our current python based local
agent (See Section 7.1).
